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THERE MAY NOT ALWAYS BE MORE FISH IN THE SEA:
WHY NOAA’S RESTRICTIONS DO NOT VIOLATE THE
MAGNUSON-STEVENS ACT
LINDSEY NICOLAI*
INTRODUCTION
In May 2013, Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley
brought suit in federal district court asserting that the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration’s (“NOAA”) new fish-catch restrictions
violated federal law.1 Her lawsuit specifically targets the fish-catch
restrictions announced earlier in the spring, which she claims violate
the Magnuson-Stevens Act by prohibiting fishermen from catching the
optimum yield.2 Moreover, she claims NOAA erred both by not using the
best science to determine fishing quotas and by neglecting to consider the
economic ramifications of reduced numbers for regional fishermen.3
These regional fishermen and other local industry representatives al-
lege that the new numbers bear little scientific basis at all and instead
reveal NOAA’s desire for “retaliation” after local fishermen complained
about perceived “overaggressive” regulatory enforcement that resulted
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2015; B.A. Government, College of William
and Mary, 2012. The author would like to thank Larry and Debra Nicolai for their love,
patience, and encouragement throughout her education and the staff of ELPR for their
dedicated editorial efforts.
1 Alyssa Carducci, Massachusetts AG Coakley Sues NOAA over Fishing Limits,
HEARTLAND INST. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2013/08/14
/massachusetts-ag-coakley-sues-noaa-over-fishing-limits, archived at http://perma.cc
/L2JG-CB7T.
2 16 U.S.C. § 1802(33)(A)(C)(2012).
The term “optimum [yield],” with respect to the yield from a fishery,
means the amount of fish which—(A) will provide the greatest overall
benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food production and
recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of
marine ecosystems; is prescribed on the basis of the maximum sus-
tainable yield from the fishery, as reduced by any relevant social,
economic, or ecological factor; and in the case of an overfished fishery,
provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with producing the maxi-
mum sustainable yield in such fishery.
Carducci, supra note 1.
3 Carducci, supra note 1.
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in both NOAA officials’ in-person apologies and the repayment of fines
in some cases.4
Attorney General Coakley’s recent action provides an appropriate
anecdote to introduce this Note, which will argue that NOAA’s new restric-
tions on allowable catch for Massachusetts fishermen does not violate the
Magnuson-Stevens Act by prohibiting them from catching an optimum
yield. In addition, this Note will explain the special federal interest by ex-
ploring NOAA’s role in fisheries management and its use of scientific and
political data to calculate optimum yield. It will reveal and discuss the ten-
sion between developing management strategies and restrictive regula-
tions that both provide for the livelihoods of regional fishermen and ensure
the protection and conservation of a valuable resource.
This Note will demonstrate NOAA’s superior ability to make these
difficult decisions as a rational actor representing the interests of the
federal government. Finally, the Note will contend that the current system
of United States fisheries management is both appropriate and necessary
to achieve the fundamental goal of conservation established by Congress
in the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
Part I provides background information about the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, NOAA, and the
National Marine Fisheries Services (“NMFS”).5 This section includes
discussion of the environmental science calculations conducted by NOAA
as part of its rule-making process.6 Moreover, it describes the scientific
evidence and projections for the future of fisheries that influence the
agency’s decisions.7 Finally, Part I details the ways in which states and
citizens can challenge federal agency decisions8 and provides a brief
summary of past litigation efforts that demonstrate the way that courts
have treated these matters in the past.9
Part II engages in a defense of NOAA as the entity most capable
and well-suited for the enforcement of the Act and the management and
regulation of fisheries.10 First, it addresses the specific arguments launched
by Attorney General Coakley in order to bolster NOAA’s (“NMFS”) role
given specific circumstances.11 This part will argue that NOAA neither
4 Id.
5 See infra Part I.
6 See infra Part I.
7 See infra Part I.
8 See infra Part I.C.
9 See infra Part I.D.
10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra Part II.
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ignored the economic effects of its regulations12 nor did it use “flawed
science” to reduce yearly catch limits.13 Next, the section explores NOAA’s
actions under the standard of review for federal agency actions and deter-
mines that those actions were neither “arbitrary” nor “capricious” but in-
stead rooted in congressional intent established by the Act.14 Moreover,
NOAA provided appropriate opportunities for public feedback, thus ful-
filling its obligation as a federal agency.15
Finally, Part III concludes this Note’s defense of NOAA by offering
a summary of the arguments contained within Part II.16 It specifically
identifies the most common arguments raised in opposition to NOAA’s role,
then it refutes those arguments. Moreover, it reiterates NOAA’s commit-
ment to balancing the science of fisheries management with the potential
economic impacts on the fisheries and the broader surrounding regions.
Ultimately, the Note concludes by describing and emphasizing the difficul-
ties of NOAA’s role, which requires a precarious balancing of environmental
and economic interests and the consideration of various viewpoints repre-
senting all aspects of the fisheries management scheme.17
I. BACKGROUND
A. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
In 1976, Congress passed the MSFCMA (“the Act”)18 to manage
and conserve fisheries in the United States at a time of drastic fisheries
stocks declines.19 Originally an industry-regulation law intended to ensure
that fish stocks remained capable of providing business opportunities, it
12 See infra Part II.B.
13 See infra Part II.C; AG Coakley Moves to KO Fish Limits, GLOUCESTER TIMES (Dec. 4,
2013), http://www.gloucestertimes.com/news/local_news/article_6260716b-9769-59b5bcce
8f9a6430dae1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P3VR-F4M3.
14 See 16 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); infra Part I.D.
15 See infra Part I.D.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part III.
18 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1884
(2012).
19 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (“the purposes of the Congress . . . to take immediate action to con-
serve and manage the fishery resources found off the coasts of the United States . . . .”).
Arguably, Congress passed the Act “largely in response to the concern over foreign fishing
off U.S. shores.” Erin R. Englebrecht, Comment, Can Aquaculture Continue to Circumvent
the Regulatory Net of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act?,
51 EMORY L.J. 1187, 1207 (2002).
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has been called “the nation’s most important federal fishery manage-
ment law.”20 Initially, the Act established Exclusive Economic Zones
(“EEZs”)—from state seaward boundaries out as far as two hundred
nautical miles—under federal management.21 The states control and
maintain jurisdiction over the three nautical miles closest to their coasts
as a result of a 1953 act of Congress.22 In addition to creating EEZs,
another critical piece of the congressional approach to domestic fisheries
management required the formation of eight regional Fishery Manage-
ment Councils (hereinafter referred to as “Councils”), each of which it
charged with the direction and management of specified fisheries em-
bracing large portions of federal waters.23
The Act charges each Council to form two advisory committees, the
first of which will concentrate efforts on science and statistics “to assist [the
Council] in the development, collection, evaluation, and peer review of such
statistical, biological, economic, social, and other scientific information
as is relevant.”24 The second committee—the Fishing Industry Advisory
Committee—focuses on providing information and recommendations to
assist in the development of fishery management plans (hereinafter re-
ferred to as “FMPs”) and possible later amendments to those plans.25
At the time of the initial passage of the MSFCMA, Congress
provided these regional management councils with much discretion to act
pursuant to the manner best suited to meet short-term economic and
industry requirements, which often resulted in compromising or sacrific-
ing the goals of conservation and environmental protection.26 Congress
reined in this provision of unbridled discretion with the 1996 passage of
the Sustainable Fisheries Act,27 which required councils to designate
conservation of fish stocks as their new principal priority.28 Only ten
20 DONALD C. BAUR ET AL., OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 275–301, 275 (2008).
21 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(11), 1811–1812; BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 275–76.
22 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20 ,at 275 (referring to the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301–1315 (2012)).
23 16 U.S.C. § 1852; BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 277. The eight Councils are: New
England, Mid Atlantic, South Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, Pacific, North Pacific,
and Western Pacific.
24 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 278.
25 Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(3)(A)).
26 Id. at 280.
27 Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996). At this time,
Congress enacted revisions to “put our fisheries back onto a sustainable path and literally
avert an environmental catastrophe on a national level.” 142 CONG. REC. 23,698 (1996)
(statement of Sen. Kerry).
28 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 280.
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years later, the Magnuson Reauthorization Act29—which amended the
MSFCMA—reiterated the change in priorities and announced a list of
ten “National Standards” meant both to guide fisheries management
policies and to provide a set of principles with which all fishery manage-
ment plans must conform.30 The recent passage of this legislation under-
scores a renewed federal interest in changing fisheries management
policies by dedicating a larger role for science, research, and conservation
efforts, all while seeking an immediate end to overfishing and increased
efforts at conservation.31
Currently, each FMP must comply with these ten “national stan-
dards” while maintaining a sharp focus on efforts at conservation. At this
stage, the Secretary of Commerce plays a key role on behalf of the federal
interest as he/she must review each FMP to confirm that it conforms to
these standards before allowing the plans to move forward through the
approval and execution phases of the process.32 The first national standard
appears most elusive at the execution phase because it requires FMPs to
achieve optimum yield from fish stocks while simultaneously attempting
to prevent overfishing.33 Further guidance addressing this standard indi-
cates that scientific and management uncertainties within each fishery
must contribute to reductions of the allowable catch statistic.34
National Standards Two and Three urge Councils to utilize the
best available scientific information to develop their FMPs and encour-
ages the coordination of management efforts between Councils and the
National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) when stocks cross multiple
jurisdictions.35 National Standards Four and Five create policies for the
fair apportionment of fishing privileges among fishermen and express the
congressional perspective that efficiency should constitute one of many
(not the only) considerations for fisheries managers.36
The sixth National Standard instructs Councils to consider the
possibility of future environmental and economic variations when they
create their FMPs.37 The seventh and eighth standards direct Councils
29 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of
2006, Pub. L. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007) (codified in both 16 U.S.C. and 33 U.S.C.).
30 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (2006); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (2012).
31 See BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 280.
32 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(1)(A).
33 See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1).
34 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(g)(2) (2009).
35 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 280.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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to minimize costs by reducing paperwork and duplication of efforts while
also urging them to consider the needs of the fishing communities and
how best to minimize the economic stresses that FMPs might place on
those communities.38 Finally, National Standards Nine and Ten require
Councils “to the extent practicable” to create plans that minimize bycatch39
within fisheries and attempt to manage them in ways that promote the
safety of humanity.40
These national standards provide the framework within which
NOAA coordinates its regulatory activities with the cooperation of the
Councils. Regional councils occupy an essential position within this
framework due in part to their front-line responsibilities to create the
FMPs that NOAA will later review for compliance. While it may seem
that Councils retain little influence in a process dominated by a federal
agency, such a view fails to consider the value of organizing a council
system based on geography. While NOAA must ensure adherence of all
FMPs to the ten national standards, Councils can operate within those
standards to highlight particularly salient or distinguishable characteris-
tics only found within their regional fisheries. In other words, Councils
should consider the national standards as helping, rather than hinder-
ing, their efforts to advocate for their local environments.
B. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (“NOAA”)
After a cursory review of some of the responsibilities of the Coun-
cils as outlined in the MSFCMA, this Note now turns to a more complete
review of NOAA and how it provides the structure and wherewithal to
maintain the fisheries management system. First, the National Marine
Fisheries Service exists as a subagency of NOAA, which itself exists as
a federal agency within the United States Department of Commerce.41
38 Id.
39 “The term ‘bycatch’ means fish which are harvested in a fishery, but which are not sold
or kept for personal use, and includes economic discards and regulatory discards. Such
term does not include fish released alive under a recreational catch and release fishery
management program.” 16 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (2012).
40 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 280.
41 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 293, n.5. For an organizational chart that illustrates
these agency relationships, see NOAA Headquarters Organization, NOAA, http://www
.pco.noaa.gov/org/noaaOrganization.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). The MSFCMA es-
pouses “ecosystem management” principles and empowers NMFS to adopt approaches
based on those standards to manage ocean and coastal environments. Ecosystem-Based
Fishery Management and the Re-Authorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
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Based on the role envisioned by Congress through the 1996 and 2006
amendments to the MSFCMA, NOAA acts on behalf of the federal gov-
ernment in demonstrating its interest in reducing fisheries yields as part
of its efforts to conserve precious environmental resources.42
Part of its fisheries management role necessitates the use of scien-
tific findings and data to calculate Maximum Sustainable Yield (“MSY”)
figures for fisheries, where MSY is calculated as the “largest average an-
nual catch” capable of being removed from a fish stock over a significant
period under average environmental conditions.43 Next, NOAA scientists
must convert those scientifically generated numbers into appropriate
Optimum Yield (“OY”) figures—which represent a downward adjustment
of MSY—and are defined as the harvest rate for a fish stock that will
“provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation.”44
Ultimately, the scientifically calculated MSY figure provides the
“ceiling” for NOAA, while OY, a political (not scientific) calculation, pro-
vides the greatest opportunities for manipulation by interested stake-
holders.45 These opportunities for statistical manipulations lead to tension
between NOAA, representing federal interests, and Councils, who once
enjoyed larger roles in regional fisheries management. Conservation groups
constitute a third interest group that adds to the contentiousness of the
debate.46 Moreover, the conflicting views of industry scientists and NMFS
scientists (whose conclusions provide the basis for catch limits for EEZ
fisheries) nullify science’s role in FMP development, leading other inter-
ests to dictate policy outcomes.47 Later, this Note will argue that the way
in which NOAA calculates OY is both politically appropriate and scientif-
ically proper based on the requirements imposed by the MSCFMA.
According to NOAA’s 2004 Fisheries Status Report, the regional
councils’ success in management of stocks is mixed as about 20% of major
stocks could be classified as “overfished” or “below a prescribed biomass
Conservation and Management Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries
Conservation, Wildlife & Oceans of the H. Comm. on Res., 107th Cong. 6–10 (2001)
(statement of William Hogarth, Ph.D., Acting Assistant Administrator for Fisheries,
National Marine Fisheries Service).
42 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 285.
43 JAMES R. RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND
POLICY, 474–75 (2d ed. 2009).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Christopher J. Carr & Harry N. Scheiber, Dealing with a Resource Crisis: Regulatory
Regimes for Managing the World’s Marine Fisheries, 21 STAN. ENVT’L. L.J. 45, 55 (2002).
276 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 39:269
threshold.”48 In 2007, the United Nations released a similar type of report
categorizing 28% of fish stocks “as overexploited, depleted, or recovering
from depletion.”49 In fact, some scientists forecast that by 2050, almost
all commercial fisheries will collapse.50 The most recent United States-
specific numbers released by the NMFS estimate that “15% of fish stocks
are subject to overfishing and that 23% of fish stocks are overfished.”51
Unfortunately, NMFS’s Annual Fisheries Status reports are only
crude, rudimentary tools for measuring the performance of the Council
system as they clearly indicate that NOAA lacks sufficient information
required to assess the population status of more than half of the species
under Council management.52 Significant problems exist with methodology
and data used to determine how many of the “known” stocks are over-
fished or subject to overfishing.53 First, the majority of data used derive
from fishery landings and not from independent scientific investigations,
which contributes to collection biases and reporting problems.54 More-
over, Councils are responsible for writing the criteria by which “success”
is measured, and the definition of “overfished” is a technical one adopted
only for a certain species by its relevant council.55
In an effort to mitigate the effects of some of the potential collec-
tion biases and reporting problems, MSFCMA gives Congress the power
to preempt state fishery management law through other specified federal
laws.56 For example, federal law establishes its own primacy in situations
where conflicts might arise. In other words, when fisheries under the con-
trol of fisheries management plans (created by MSFCMA) predominantly
encompass federal waters and state management of those fisheries in state
waters “will substantially and adversely affect the carrying out of such
48 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 278–79.
49 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. (FAO), THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND
AQUACULTURE 2008 (2009), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0250e/i0250e.pdf.
50 See Boris Worm et al., Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services, 314
SCIENCE 787, 788–89 (2006) (predicting downward trends in fisheries sustainability).
51 NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., 2009 STATUS OF U.S. FISHERIES 1 (2010), available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/statusoffisheries/2009/StatusFisheries_2009.pdf. “Subject
to overfishing” signifies a fish stock in which the mortality of harvest rate exceeds what
is required to provide for maximum sustainable yield. Id. “Overfished” means that the
biomass level of the fish stock resides below an established threshold contained in the
fisheries management plan for the stock. Id.
52 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 279.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 276.
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fishery management plan[s],” then Congress directs NOAA to exercise its
regulatory and enforcement authority over the fishing activities in state
waters as well.57 However, states can exercise some degree of control over
fishing activities in federal waters through the Coastal Zone Management
Act (“CZMA”).58 This act contains descriptions of administrative and
judicial procedures available to coastal states whose leaders believe that
proposed federal activities will “affect any land or water use or natural
resource” in a way that is incongruent with the “enforceable policies” of
that state’s coastal zone management plan.59
Under the Commerce Department umbrella, NOAA takes respon-
sibility for execution of the congressional initiatives contained within the
MSFCMA. For this purpose, NOAA’s subagency, the National Marine
Fisheries Service, operates as the federal government’s agent vis-à-vis the
Department of Commerce. This role requires the NMFS to assemble and
analyze scientific data for the purposes of setting guidelines and limits
for regional councils to utilize in preparing their FMPs. Perhaps one of the
most important duties for the NMFS results from the requirement to com-
bine the scientific with the political. In other words, the limiting figures
NOAA provides to the Councils must consider primarily the best way to
conserve the environment while also providing opportunities for indus-
tries whose participants depend on fisheries for their economic survival.
Poor performance by Councils, as seen in recent annual reports60 and
scientific studies,61 leads to the logical conclusion that without NOAA’s
involvement, the state of fisheries may be direr than ever imagined.
C. State and Citizen Powers to Challenge Federal Agency Decisions
As part of its powers under the CZMA, if a state believes that the
proposed federal actions will “affect any land or water use or natural re-
source” in a way that is incompatible with the “enforceable policies” of that
state’s extant coastal zone management plan, it can seek recourse through
both administrative and judicial remedies.62 Despite coastal states’ abili-
ties to assert these rights of recourse, the total absence of reported court
decisions relating to the exercise of those rights suggests a confirmed
57 16 U.S.C. § 1856(b) (2012).
58 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 277.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 278–79.
61 Worm et al., supra note 50.
62 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 277.
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reluctance to challenge the federal government’s actions and decisions.63
This reluctance, perhaps, results from an entrenched belief that such chal-
lenges stand little chance of success in the face of considerable substan-
tive and procedural barriers to questioning federal agency judgment.64
The first such barrier concerns the standard of review, which is
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accor-
dance with applicable law,” which provides a high barrier for any litigant
to surmount.65 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,66 the Supreme Court increased difficulties for plaintiffs
challenging federal agency action when it “created a default rule of defer-
ence to reasonable agency interpretations in the event of statutory am-
biguity or silence, reading such silence as implying Congress’s intent to
allow an agency to fill in the gaps.”67
Another barrier results from the prevention of discovery, which
both prevents agency policymakers from facing direct judicial inquiry
and requires challengers to demonstrate the unlawful, procedurally
flawed, or otherwise unreasonable nature of the agency’s action at the
beginning of litigation.68 In addition to this initial procedural barrier,
even challengers who prevail in their suits receive a reward of question-
able value in the form of court-ordered remand to the same federal
agency charging it to issue another decision.69 Even despite these bar-
riers, however, plaintiffs do win their challenges and remands result in
more favorable determinations.70
63 Id.
64 Jeffrey W. Leppo, Litigating Against Government Agencies: Case Studies in Challenge
to Agency Decisions Under Federal Environmental Statutes, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10575, 10576 (2013) (asserting that the “defining principle of so-called record
review cases drives a series of primary litigation characteristics that, from the perspective
of a party litigating against an agency, are essential to understand and, for the most part,
inherently biased for the agency.”).
65 Id. See also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
66 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
67 Kate Stanford, Student Article, The Need for Chevron Step Zero in Judicial Review of
Interpretations Developed by Fishery Management Councils, 19 N.Y.U. ENVT’L. L.J. 380,
395 (2012) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 844).
68 Leppo, supra note 64; see also BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 285 (noting that citizens
challenging the validity of FMPs, amendments, and/or regulations must demonstrate
“reli[ance] on factors Congress has not intended it to consider, . . . fail[ure] to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offer[ing] an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence . . . or . . . implausib[ility] that . . . could not be ascribed to a dif-
ference in view or the product of agency expertise.”).
69 Leppo, supra note 64.
70 Id.
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Although plaintiffs sometimes achieve favorable results after
challenging federal agencies, the Court’s opinion in Chevron underscores
the judicially common assertion that federal agencies maintain superior
institutional capabilities to make decisions and policies in areas where
Congress fails to speak.71 Justice Stevens’s majority opinion continued
describing this deference, ultimately asserting that courts should not
replace agency interpretations with their own judgments, regardless of
whether Congress explicitly or implicitly delegates decision-making
authority to those agencies.72
D. Significant Court Battles over MSFCMA
While the Supreme Court’s decision in the Chevron case demon-
strates its willingness to defer to the federal government’s decisions in
certain circumstances, citizens and groups still seek to challenge those
decisions before other courts. Several of these decisions and their holdings
will now be explored along with their influence on the fisheries manage-
ment framework.
1. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Daley
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Daley,73 the court estab-
lished a rule that Council management procedures must have a greater
than 50% chance of success for the purposes of complying with MSFCMA.74
In addition, the court repudiated the lower court’s suggestion that the
Act’s explicit commitment to conservation conflicted with its goal of mitigat-
ing adverse economic effects.75 However, the court acknowledged that the
Act dictates that the NMFS “must give priority to conservation measures.”76
In fact, the court further elaborated that adverse economic consequences
only enter the FMP discussion when two competing plans achieve compa-
rable conservation measures.77
71 Stanford, supra note 67 (noting the appearance of this kind of language in Justice
Stevens’s majority opinion for the Court).
72 Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. 865 and explaining the agency capabilities
that require courts to defer to agency judgments).
73 209 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
74 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 287.
75 Natural Res. Def. Council, 209 F.3d at 753.
76 See id.
77 See id.; see also 50 C.F.R. § 600.345(b)(1) (1999) (“Where two alternatives achieve
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Moreover, the court amplified the Supreme Court’s Chevron
holding by explaining that its decision engaged in Chevron Step Two
review by investigating “whether the agency’s disputed action reflects a
reasonable and permissible construction of the statute.”78 The court then
finds that, without a specific quota figure, the NMFS’s position fails to
merit deference.79 In fact, the court left little doubt about its opinion of
the validity of the quota figure when it asserted that it “completely
‘diverges from any realistic meaning’ of the Fishery Act that it cannot
survive scrutiny. . . .”80 In reversing the lower court’s judgment deferring
to the NMFS, the court notes that its purpose in hearing cases does not
constitute a “rubber stamp” for agency actions.81
2. Oceana, Inc. v. Locke
Adding to its case law, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in
Oceana, Inc. v. Locke,82 remanded an Amendment to a FMP with directions
for the lower court to vacate the Amendment and remand it to the NMFS
for additional proceedings.83 The litigation began when Oceana, Incorpo-
rated, sued Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke along with the NMFS,
alleging that an amendment to a FMP violated the MSFCMA and the
Administrative Procedure Act.84 In a prior opinion, the district court found
no violation and entered summary judgment for the appellee NMFS.85
similar conservation goals, the alternative that . . . minimizes the adverse impacts on
[fishing] communities would be the preferred alternative.”).
78 Natural Res. Def. Council, 209 F.3d at 754 (explaining that the Act lacks a precise
quota measure, which necessitates an analysis of whether the agency’s challenged action
is a reasonable and allowable construction of the statute).
79 See id.
80 Natural Res. Def. Council, 209 F.3d at 755 (explaining that NMFS rejects its opinion
by suggesting that the court owes deference to its “scientific” judgments).
81 See id. The court asserts that if it simply rubber-stamped agency actions and decisions,
such a decision would be “tantamount to abdicating the judiciary’s responsibility under
the Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. (quoting A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d
1484, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
82 Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 670 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
83 Id. at 1243.
84 Id. at 1239 (challenging in particular Amendment 16 and noting specifically that
appellant organization challenged the legality of the NMFS methodology used to track
bycatch in the Northeast coastal fisheries).
85 Id. (noting that bycatch can be defined either as “fish that are inadvertently or
unavoidably captured by nets or other gear and then discarded,” 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a), or
as “fish which are harvested in a fishery, but which are not sold or kept for personal use,”
16 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(3)).
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In its later analysis, the D.C. Circuit first considered and weighed
heavily in NMFS’s favor the fact that the regulation was implemented
through full notice and comment rule-making procedures, which required
the court to show substantial deference toward NMFS.86 However, the
court later found that the NMFS-proposed (and regional council-supported)
amendment to the FMP failed to survive the “arbitrary and capricious”
standard of review.87 Its failure resulted from carving out for itself an
exception providing total discretion for it to decide when an “external
operational constraint prevents [it] from fully implementing the required
coverage levels.”88 The most problematic result of this indefinite exception
proceeds from the fact that the amendment contains no safeguard prevent-
ing NMFS from annually announcing the existence of some “constraint.”89
In the end, this decision reiterates the court’s earlier finding in
National Resources Defense Council v. Daley,90 providing little to no
deference to federal agency decisions or regulations, which conflict with
the explicit intentions found in the MSFCMA. As before, the court shows
an unwillingness to rubber-stamp agency decisions and specifically
expresses its discomfort with rules that operate to provide agencies with
excess discretion that can then be manipulated to allow an agency’s
actions to go unchecked.91
3. Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brennen
Earlier decisions from the Ninth and First Circuit Courts of Appeal
provide a more complete picture of the case law surrounding the federal
agency-regional council relationship. The Ninth Circuit case, Northwest
Environmental Defense Center v. Brennen,92 involved affirmance of a district
court grant of summary judgment for the appellee.93 The court’s analysis
revealed that the agency regulations at issue were neither arbitrary nor
86 Id. at 117 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944)).
87 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)
(containing instructions for judicial review of regulations pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act).
88 Oceana, Inc., 670 F.3d at 1241 (citing Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act Provisions, 73 Fed. Reg. 4736, 4738 (Jan. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 648)).
89 Id.
90 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
91 Oceana, Inc., 670 F.3d at 1243.
92 Nw. Envt’l Def. Ctr. v. Brennen (“NEDC”), 958 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1992).
93 NEDC, 958 F.2d at 932, 938.
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capricious and instead constituted reasonable decisions aligned with the
intentions of the MSFCMA.94 Specifically, the appellant challenged as
unlawful a few regulations promulgated by the appellee (Secretary of
Commerce) permitting overfishing in direct defiance of the MSFCMA.95
While the court ultimately deems the regulations reasonable and
defers to the Secretary’s judgment,96 its analysis reveals some of the
difficulties associated with vague or imprecise definitions. This difficulty
results because the Act fails to define “overfishing” explicitly, which
provides NEDC the opportunity to make an argument about what defini-
tion the court should use.97 Instead, the Secretary argues for the use of
a definition contained within a federal regulation.98 In choosing the
Secretary’s preferred definition, the court demonstrates its willingness
to interpret the MSFCMA as providing the federal government with broad
discretion to define key statutory terms provided they are reasonable and
adhere to the intention of the Act.99 After this analysis, the court concludes
by emphasizing its responsibility to defer to the Secretary’s decision-
making after its determination that the questioned acts proved reason-
able in view of the plain meaning and purpose of the statute.100
4. Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v. Franklin
Like the Ninth Circuit decision described above, the First Circuit
litigation again involved an environmental advocacy group challenging the
federal government’s role in fisheries management through the office of the
Secretary of Commerce.101 Without delving into the specifics of the consent
94 NEDC, 958 F.2d at 936. In a prior decision, the District Court for the District of
Columbia noted, “[t]he question is not whether this Court agrees with the decision of the
agency; the question is whether the decision made by the agency finds support in the
administrative record.” Se. Fisheries Ass’n v. Mosbacher, 773 F. Supp. 435, 439 (citing
C&W Fish Co. v. Fox, 745 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1990)).
95 NEDC, 958 F.2d at 932.
96 Id. at 935.
97 Id. at 934 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 602.11(d)(1) (1990)) (noting that NEDC’s preferred definition
for overfishing “means all fishing which exceeds maximum sustainable yield.”).
98 Id. at 935 (providing the text of the Secretary’s preferred definition: “Overfishing is a
level or rate of fishing mortality that jeopardizes the long-term capacity of a stock or
stock complex to produce [maximum sustainable yield] on a continuing basis.” 50 C.F.R.
§ 602.11(c)(1) (1990)).
99 Id. at 935 (explaining that the intention of the Act is “maximum utilization of fishery
resources consistent with the long-term health of the fishery.”).
100 Id. at 935.
101 Conservation Law Found. of New England v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54, 56 (1st Cir. 1993).
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decree at issue in Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v.
Franklin,102 this litigation again tested the power of the federal govern-
ment while simultaneously probing courts’ willingness to defer to that
power in certain circumstances. Consistent with the Ninth Circuit litiga-
tion, the challengers again argued that the Secretary acted outside the
law in promulgating certain regulations.103 Moreover, this court’s analysis
paralleled the Ninth Circuit’s when it, too, analyzed the claim by looking
to statutory language and plain meaning.104
This analysis demonstrates that the MSFCMA explicitly empow-
ers the Secretary of Commerce to initiate certain procedures and enforce
certain regulations after waiting a reasonable time for the Councils to act
in accordance with the statute.105 Following this line of reasoning, the
court asserts that its statutory interpretation provides the Secretary
with appropriate due deference to follow the mandate of the MSFCMA,
which charges him with the responsibility to prevent overfishing.106
Moreover, the court notes that Councils fulfill their roles by creating FMPs.
The review of FMPs allows the federal government, acting through the
Secretary and NMFS, discretion to decide whether Councils show appro-
priate progress in conservation and management goals.107
5. Summary of Pertinent Litigation
A review of the cases above demonstrates that conducting fisheries
management in accordance with the Act presents a complicated set of
problems. Several seemingly concrete standards arise that should guide
courts facing future litigation related to fisheries management under the
MSFCMA. First, a case predating those discussed above stated that “[a]n
action by the Secretary [of Commerce] is presumed to be valid, and the
102 Id. at 58 (“The consent decree established a timetable for a FMP or an amendment . . .
applicable to New England waters that would ‘eliminate the overfished condition of cod and
yellowtail flounder stocks in five years after implementation and . . . eliminate the overfished
condition of haddock stocks in ten years after implementation.’ ”(quoting Conservation Law
Found. v. Mosbacher, No. 91-11759-MA, slip op. at 2 (D. Mass., Aug. 28, 1991))).
103 Id. at 59.
104 Id. at 60.
105 Conservation Law Foundation, 989 F.2d at 60 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1)(B)) (2012).
106 Id.
107 Id. See 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(10) (stating that the Secretary’s discretion allows him to
include “such other measures, requirements, or conditions and restrictions as are deter-
mined to be necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the
fishery,” again reiterating the grant of discretion found in the MSFCMA).
284 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 39:269
Court must not substitute its own judgment for that of the Secretary.”108
Second, the courts acknowledged that the Act explicitly requires the
NMFS to prioritize conservation efforts above all other pursuits.109
In a similar vein, the courts reiterate that Councils fulfill their
MSFCMA roles by creating FMPs, which NMFS later reviews to ensure
they adhere to the statutory standards.110 These FMP reviews and other
rule-making procedures logically require that the NMFS exercise broad
discretionary powers, including the ability to define essential terms,
provided those definitions prove reasonable and track closely the inten-
tions of the statute.111 The courts follow the same procedures to decide on
the reasonableness and consistency of the Secretary’s challenged actions
after engaging in classic statutory analysis that includes reviews of lan-
guage and plain meaning.112
After completing the statutory analysis, courts analyze whether
the Secretary’s challenged rules or actions merit deference by the judi-
ciary branch—a decision ultimately determined by the reasonableness
of the acts at issue.113 The evaluation of whether to provide deference
appears both controversial and difficult for the courts; however, they ex-
plicitly state and then reiterate through analysis their refusal to serve
as “rubber stamps” for agency actions, which may account for the exten-
sive analysis that ensues when courts attempt to assess reasonableness.114
This desire to avoid rubber-stamping federal agency actions, without
earnest review, explains the court’s unwillingness to provide deference to
those actions that directly conflict with congressional intentions memori-
alized in the MSFCMA.115
II. NOAA IS THE AGENCY MOST WELL-SUITED TO THE TASK OF
FEDERAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
The brief review of some of the past litigation pitting citizens and
other parties against the federal government highlights one aspect of the
tensions surrounding fisheries management. An equally, if not more,
108 See Fisheries Ass’n v. Mosbacher, 773 F. Supp. 435, 441–42 (D.D.C. 1991) (citing Envtl.
Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
109 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 277.
110 NEDC, 958 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1992).
111 Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 670 F.3d 1238, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Stanford, supra note 67, at 395.
115 Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 670 F.3d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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important portion of that tension results from a seemingly pervasive belief
among groups at the grassroots level that NOAA is ill-suited for or does
not fulfill adequately its role as federal fisheries manager, decision maker,
and enforcer. This belief seemed a major influence on Attorney General
Coakley’s decision to file suit against NOAA in May 2013.116 Her complaint,
filed in United States District Court in Boston,117 “alleges that NOAA
ignored the devastating economic impact of the new regulations”118 and
utilized “flawed science to drastically reduce the annual ‘catch limits’ for
cod and other species imposed on the Massachusetts fishing industry.”119
Without the ability to study the exact materials on which Coakley
specifically bases her allegations, a successful defense of NOAA must
treat these arguments more broadly. Moreover, a successful defense of
NMFS requires analysis of whether agency actions, at any time, could be
deemed “arbitrary and capricious.”120 Finally, evidence must demonstrate
that the agency provided enough opportunity for feedback from the pub-
lic, and that the agency considered such feedback in its rule-making and
enforcement process.
A. NOAA and Congressional Role/Intent in MSFCMA
“Through the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the United States has a clear
mandate to achieve sustainable fisheries.”121 In order to realize that man-
date, Congress must maintain (and exercise) the power to preempt state
fishery management laws, which it accomplishes through its primacy as
established by the Magnuson-Stevens Act122 and through other environ-
mentally based federal legislation.123 Given the statutorily promoted,
legislatively recognized preemptive power of the federal government, it
116 Carducci, supra note 1.
117 AG Coakley Moves to KO Fish Limits, supra note 13.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Leppo, supra note 64.
121 NOAA’s Fishery Science: Is the Lack of Basic Science Costing Jobs?: Oversight Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans, and Insular Affairs of the H. Comm.
on Natural Resources, 112th Cong. 13 (2011) (statement of Eric Schwaab, Assistant
Administrator, National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration).
122 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 276; see 16 U.S.C. § 1856(b) (2012) (describing the way
in which NMFS may exercise regulatory authority over fishing activities in state waters).
123 Other federal statutes that limit state authority within state waters include the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Atlantic
Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act. BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 276.
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is no surprise that states often feel constrained or restricted by NOAA’s
regulations. Moreover, the means by which outsiders evaluate the status
reports for specific fisheries relies overmuch on a binary conception of
success or failure,124 which leaves no room for exploration of the gray areas
within which many of these critical agency-council interactions occur.
B. NOAA Did Not Ignore the Economic Impact of its Regulations
Attorney General Coakley’s assertion that NOAA (through NMFS)
ignores fishermen in its rule-making process diametrically opposes Na-
tional Standard Eight,125 which expressly requires that NMFS “take into
account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities” by
developing regulations that allow the sustainment of the industry with as
few negative economic impacts as possible.126 Importantly, this standard
underscores NOAA’s chief priorities as the “prevention of overfishing and
rebuilding of overfished stocks.”127 In other words, environmental interests
in preventing overfishing supplant the requirement that NOAA attempt to
minimize negative impacts on the fishing industry. NOAA’s role as guard-
ian of fisheries almost necessitates that its decisions may adversely affect
the economic interests of fishermen who likely would benefit most from a
regulatory scheme with far fewer restrictions.
The regional councils’ concerns—serving as proxies for fishermen’s
concerns—along with other competing and divergent interests require
the federal government to take an active role in fisheries management
in order to protect the environment.128 A recent example of NOAA taking
seriously the potential adverse effects on fishermen arose as a result of
the New England Fishery Management Council’s (“NEFMC”) substan-
tially reduced annual catch limits for certain fish stocks in 2013.129 NOAA
124 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 279.
125 See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8) (2012).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 292. Ironically, deferring conservation efforts fails to
serve long-term industry interests (as well as environmental ones) for at least two
reasons. First, the industry’s longevity and prosperity depends on maintenance of healthy
fish stocks. Id. Second, deferring to the future these difficult choices will make them
harder for NOAA to implement and even more difficult for fishermen to absorb. Id.
129 Emergency Action Extension for Northeastern Monkfish Fishery Relating to
Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions, 78 Fed. Reg. 63,892 (Apr. 30, 2013) (to be codified at
50 C.F.R. pt. 648). This reduction occurred as part of Framework Adjustment 50 to the
NE Multispecies FMP and “was necessary to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished
groundfish stocks consistent with rebuilding plans required under [the Act].” Id.
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understood that these reduced numbers likely would result in substantial
negative economic impacts for fishermen, which prompted it to develop a
rule to open the monkfish fishery under emergency conditions based on a
request from the NEFMC.130 In other words, NOAA proved receptive and
sympathetic to the concerns of fishermen and acted to mitigate negative
economic impacts, while never failing to maintain focus on its environ-
mental priorities.131
When compared to other entities that might administer fisheries
management, NOAA’s actions suggest that it is both capable and willing.
However, as noted in the summary in Part I,132 past court decisions show
a distinct unwillingness by judges to impose the necessary, though some-
times drastic cuts often required to ensure long-term fisheries health.133
At the same time, the federal government does not seek an end to the
fishing industry nor desire to harm it economically; however, it must use
the tools available to it—regulating the people who fish, their equipment,
and their catch amounts—in order to achieve the national goal of sustain-
able fisheries and protected environments.
C. NOAA Did Not Use Flawed Science to Reduce Catch Limits
A second assertion found in Attorney General Coakley’s complaint
relates to NOAA’s alleged use of flawed science in developing its regu-
lations.134 Like the first allegation, this argument directly counters one
of NOAA’s “national standards.”135 In this case, her assertion counters
National Standard Two, which states that “conservation and manage-
ment measures shall be based upon the best scientific information avail-
able.”136 In addition to countering a national standard, Coakley’s allegation
appears even less credible in light of a demonstrated shift in the leader-
ship of NOAA prior to the announcement of the decreased catch numbers
with which she takes issue.137
130 Id.
131 See id.
132 See supra Part I.
133 BAUR ET AL., supra note 20, at 292.
134 AG Coakley Moves to KO Fish Limits, supra note 13.
135 See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (2012).
136 Id. § 1851(a)(2).
137 In 2008, as part of his “Science Team,” President Obama nominated Dr. Jane Lubchenco,
a marine ecologist and environmental scientist, to serve as NOAA administrator. NOAA
Administrator: Dr. Jane Lubchenco, NOAA, http://www.noaa.gov/lubchenco.html (last
visited Oct. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/32YV-7C4N. He regarded highly her
experience in connecting human well-being to the environment using science. Id.
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1. NOAA’s Science Team
With its new “Science Team”138 in place in 2009, NOAA began to
approach fisheries with a greater emphasis on how to use science to im-
prove the dismal state of many national fisheries.139 Echoing a common
refrain, however, the new leadership noted the uphill battle faced by any
efforts attempting to repair the state of fisheries.140 Ultimately, the new
science-minded NOAA leaders took comfort in the fact that they could
justify measures that may appear to protect the environment at the ex-
pense of the industry by noting that “in the end fishing jobs depend on
fish, and fish depend on healthy oceans.”141 The essential part of that
quotation, as it relates to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act, is that the oceans (environment) must be protected
before the fish can be healthy. Only at that point—when healthy fish
survive at appropriate levels—can the fishing industry achieve a higher
level of profitability.
2. Misunderstandings Perpetuate Mistruths
The Act itself memorializes this point in its prioritizing of the
environment above all other interests.142 Regardless of NOAA’s attempts
to place science and the environment at the forefront of fisheries man-
agement, officials like Rhode Island’s Attorney General Peter Kilmartin
continue to misunderstand and mischaracterize the congressional direc-
tive of the Act as it concerns NOAA’s role.143 In his amicus curiae brief to
Coakley’s suit against NOAA, Mr. Kilmartin asserted that “fisheries
138 See id.
139 Cornelia Dean, NOAA Chief Believes in Science as Social Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/science/earth/24prof.html?_r&_r=0, archived
at http://perma.cc/XU6A-UEXV.
140 Id. Dr. Lubchenco said, primarily, that “. . . fishing communities, scientists, regulators
and other stakeholders in the debate need to overcome a legacy of bitterness and dis-
trust.” Id.
141 Id. Dr. Lubchenco’s background included numerous successful challenges to the
“typical” practice of science where “researchers cannot spare time for public involvement,
much less public service.” Id.
142 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000); BAUR ET AL.,
supra note 20, at 280.
143 Fish Talk in the News—Friday, December 13, TALKINGFISH.ORG (Dec. 13, 2013), http://
www.talkingfish.org/in-the-news/fish-talk-in-the-news-friday-december-13, archived at
http://perma.cc/QU4-3LU5.
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regulations should “balance the need to conserve fishery resources with
the well being of the fishing communities that it will impact.”144
3. Bad Science: Industry Advocates vs. Scientists
Mr. Kilmartin’s misguided statement serves as a useful introduc-
tion to the debate over the kind and quality of science NOAA and the
NMFS use when making decisions about the management of fisheries.
According to the NOAA website, NOAA’s Office of Science and Technol-
ogy manages the agency’s scientific information resources and oversees
the development of internal policies that emphasize scientific integrity
through the use of quality data, analyses, and information produced by
agency activities.145
In fact, at the end of 2011,146 NOAA issued its first ever Adminis-
trative Order specifically discussing its policy of “Scientific Integrity.”147
In this document, NOAA reaffirms its commitment to fostering a “contin-
uing culture of scientific excellence and integrity”148 while strengthening
public confidence in its scientific methods and practices.149 Operating in
conjunction with its methods, NOAA’s “Principles of Scientific Integrity”
include recognition of the division between scientific methods and policy
decisions based on the results of those methods.150 To fulfill these princi-
ples, NOAA encourages its scientists “to publish data and findings in ways
that contribute to the effective transparency and dissemination of NOAA
science and that enhance NOAA’s reputation for reliable science . . . .”151
In direct contrast to NOAA’s stated commitment to utilize the
“best scientific information available,”152 some industry advocates and rep-
resentatives accuse NOAA and NMFS of using “wrong and antiquated
science.”153 In fact, some of those advocates even began an Internet/
144 Id.
145 Science Quality Assurance, NOAA, https://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/science-quality
-assurance/index (last visited Oct. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3BE6-SBCM.
146 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ADMIN. ORDER 202-735D, SCIENTIFIC
INTEGRITY POLICY (2011).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2012).
153 Carmine Gorga, My View: Bad NOAA Science Rooted in Flawed Model, GLOUCESTER
DAILY TIMES (May 24, 2012), http://www.gloucestertimes.com/opinion/article_1e669233
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newspaper campaign to gain signatures for two petitions,154 noting that
legal action would prove useful only in the short-term, while political
action would provide the only long-term solution.155 Interestingly, one critic
of NOAA as fisheries manager initially appears to take issue with NOAA’s
use of faulty science156 while later reversing course and resorting to blam-
ing poor, sloppy, or incomplete congressional drafting of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act for preventing NOAA and NMFS from using better science
to influence policy decisions.157 Only two years later,158 the same critic
launched a new attack, this time claiming that NOAA makes decisions
based on unreliable numbers gathered based on questionable scientific
bases.159 The critic, of course, acknowledges the inherent difficulties of ob-
taining accurate information from the kinds of surveys NOAA must con-
duct; however, he offers no suggestions of alternatives or better practices,160
which suggests either that no viable alternatives exist or that NOAA does
the best work possible given the constraints within which it must operate.
Based on the unconvincing arguments pressed by anti-NOAA critics and
industry-first advocates, NOAA’s record demonstrates its commitment to
using the best science in a field replete with obstacles for effective data-
gathering and analysis.
D. NOAA’s Actions Were Not “Arbitrary and Capricious”
Prior case law establishes this deference as a matter of law and
shows an unwillingness by the courts to intervene in matters pitting
federal government decisions supporting environmental conservation
-420e-5402-a792-7e3863fe3c3e.html, archived at http://perma.cc/942K-RNQR; Len Belcaro,
Flexibility, Better Science & The Magnuson-Stevens Act, BIG GAME FISHING J., http://www
.biggamefishingjournal.com/editorial13.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/UP7M-68MG.
154 One petition is directed at President Obama and asks him to “[s]top NOAA [n]ow,” and
the other seeks Congressional amendment of the Magnuson-Stevens Act by inserting
information about the predator/prey model and by requiring NOAA/NMFS to direct major
enforcement efforts toward the large corporations, while leaving mostly untouched smaller,
independent fishing fleets. See Gorga, supra note 153.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. Specifically, the author takes issue with the fact that the statute does not follow
predator/prey fisheries management, which he notes is not included in the Act, under
which NOAA and NMFS must operate and, thus, respect. Id.
158 Gorga, supra note 153.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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efforts against regional assertions of economic needs.161 While the fed-
eral government will not ignore the economic importance of fisheries to
the industry as a whole, it refuses to sacrifice the need for environmental
protection in exchange for increased opportunities for fishermen and re-
lated industries.162
According to the Administrative Procedure Act,163 a court may set
aside any agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, otherwise not in accordance with law.”164 To determine if an agency
decision meets this standard, a court should “consider whether the deci-
sion was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment.”165 Next, the agency must
provide a satisfactory explanation for its policy decision that connects
sufficiently the facts found and agency conclusions.166 In the end, an agency
decision is deemed arbitrary and capricious if the agency relies on factors
Congress did not intend it to consider, fails to consider a key part of the
problem, offers a justification that counters the evidence on the record, or
is so implausible that it could not be the result of a difference of opinion
or agency expertise.167
Given the standard above, the actions with which Coakley’s
lawsuit finds fault do not rise to the level of arbitrary and capricious.
First, looking to the Interim Final Rule promulgated by NMFS and
recorded in the Federal Register, the reader concludes that the agency
expended a significant amount of effort toward the development of the
standards with which Coakley disagrees.168 In other words, NMFS/NOAA
actions satisfied the requirement to consider all relevant factors.169 In
fact, during the development and promulgation process for the rule,
NOAA provided opportunities for public feedback through the traditional
notice-and-comment rule-making procedures prescribed for federal
161 See supra Parts I.C, I.D.
162 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
163 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
164 Id. § 706(2)(A).
165 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (quoting Citizens
to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
166 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Adm’n, 538 F.3d 1172,
1193 (9th Cir. 2008).
167 See O’Keeffe’s, Inc. v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 92 F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir.
1996).
168 See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act Provisions, 78 Fed.
Reg. 26,172 (May 3, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
169 Id.
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agencies.170 A thorough review of the Framework Adjustment171 reveals
extensive consideration of various factors related to environmental sci-
ence, industry concerns, and public comment. All of which suggest that
a court would struggle to define NOAA’s actions as arbitrary and capri-
cious. Therefore, a court will provide NOAA/NMFS great deference when
its decisions are challenged in court.172
III. NOAA MUST REMAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT IF PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
REMAINS THE CHIEF PRIORITY OF THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS
FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT
Ultimately, NOAA seeks to protect valuable natural resources
while taking into consideration the fact that fishermen depend on a
region’s waters for their livelihoods. This is a precarious balance to
strike; however, NOAA proves itself capable of making informed, though
often unpopular, decisions. In order for NOAA to maintain its vital role
as federal fisheries manager, Massachusetts Attorney General Coakley’s
suit must fail. First, NOAA—as representative of the federal govern-
ment—is the most well-positioned to honor the environmental commit-
ments at the heart of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.173 Second, NOAA’s
recent recommitment to using the best possible scientific practices
emphasizes that its paramount concern is the protection of the environ-
ment and the conservation of valuable fisheries.174 In fact, various courts
hearing numerous disputes over the last several decades overwhelmingly
upheld NOAA’s practices as consistent with its statutory mandate and
in no way “arbitrary and capricious.”175
Moreover, NOAA continues to fulfill its role by involving the
public and other interest and environmental groups through direct and
indirect measures including traditional notice-and-comment rule-making
proceedings.176 Ultimately, through the Magnuson-Stevens Act and
170 Id. “Based on the public comments received . . . NMFS is implementing the proposed
measures as an interim final rule to become effective at the start of FY 2014.” Id. At that
point, NMFS will seek additional public comment. Id.
171 Id.
172 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
173 See supra Part II.
174 Dean, supra note 139; see NOAA Administrator: Dr. Jane Lubchenco, supra note 137.
175 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see supra Part I.D.
176 See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act Provisions, 78 Fed.
Reg. 26,172 (May 3, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
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subsequent renewals, Congress expressed its clear intent to make envi-
ronmental conservation and protection its chief priority,177 even at the
(unfortunate) expense of the fishing industry in some instances. In other
words, Congress appeared to decide that the long-term viability of a
fishery would prove much more beneficial than allowing fishermen to
benefit maximally from fisheries in the short-term in ways that would
prove unsustainable for the future. NOAA and NMFS remain capable of
fulfilling congressional objectives and continue to honor congressional
intent by making difficult decisions to protect the environment, so that
“there will always be more fish in the sea.”
177 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

